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nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3230>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3232>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3233>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3278>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3291>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3382>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3792>
nobel:category <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/category/Economic_Sciences>
nobel:contribution A creative application of game theory to important social, political and economic problems. Showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. (en)
nobel:field game theory (en)
is dcterms:hasPart of <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/nobelprize/Economic_Sciences/2005>
dcterms:isPartOf <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/nobelprize/Economic_Sciences/2005>
rdfs:label Economic Sciences 2005, Thomas C. Schelling
nobel:laureate <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureate/800>
is nobel:laureateAward of <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureate/800>
nobel:motivation "for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis" (en)
nobel:share 2
rdf:type nobel:LaureateAward
rdf:type dbpedia-owl:Award
nobel:university <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/university/University_of_Maryland%2C_Department_of_Economics_and_School_of_Public_Policy>
nobel:year 2005 (xsd:integer)


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