Economic Sciences 2001, A. Michael Spence

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nobel:contribution	Showed how the able agents may improve the market outcome by taking costly action to signal information to poorly informed recipients. An important example is education as a signal of high individual productivity in the labor market. It is not necessary for education to have intrinsic value. Costly investment in education as such signals high ability. (en)
nobel:field	economics of information (en)
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nobel:motivation	"for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information" (en)
nobel:motivation	”för deras analys av marknader med asymmetrisk information” (sv)
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Metadata

<http://data.nobelprize.org/data/laureateaward/779>

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