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nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/1520>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/1682>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/1690>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/1708>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/2137>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/2157>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3673>
nobel:category <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/category/Economic_Sciences>
nobel:contribution Showed how the able agents may improve the market outcome by taking costly action to signal information to poorly informed recipients. An important example is education as a signal of high individual productivity in the labor market. It is not necessary for education to have intrinsic value. Costly investment in education as such signals high ability. (en)
nobel:field economics of information (en)
is dcterms:hasPart of <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/nobelprize/Economic_Sciences/2001>
dcterms:isPartOf <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/nobelprize/Economic_Sciences/2001>
rdfs:label Economic Sciences 2001, A. Michael Spence
nobel:laureate <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureate/745>
is nobel:laureateAward of <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureate/745>
nobel:motivation "for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information" (en)
nobel:motivation ”för deras analys av marknader med asymmetrisk information” (sv)
nobel:share 3
rdf:type nobel:LaureateAward
rdf:type dbpedia-owl:Award
nobel:university <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/university/Stanford_University>
nobel:year 2001 (xsd:integer)


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