Economic Sciences 1996, William Vickrey
Resource URI: http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureateaward/699
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Developed methods of analyzing the problems of incomplete, or asymmetrical, information. Specialized in auction theory.
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economics of information
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Economic Sciences 1996, William Vickrey
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"for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information"
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2
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1996
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2021-01-24T19:40:00.288Z
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