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nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/2786>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/3086>
nobel:awardFile <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/awardfile/904>
nobel:category <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/category/Economic_Sciences>
nobel:contribution Developed methods of analyzing the problems of incomplete, or asymmetrical, information. Specialized in auction theory. (en)
nobel:field economics of information (en)
is dcterms:hasPart of <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/nobelprize/Economic_Sciences/1996>
dcterms:isPartOf <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/nobelprize/Economic_Sciences/1996>
rdfs:label Economic Sciences 1996, William Vickrey
nobel:laureate <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureate/716>
is nobel:laureateAward of <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/laureate/716>
nobel:motivation (sv)
nobel:motivation "for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information" (en)
nobel:share 2
rdf:type nobel:LaureateAward
rdf:type dbpedia-owl:Award
nobel:university <http://data.nobelprize.org/resource/university/Columbia_University>
nobel:year 1996 (xsd:integer)


Metadata

<http://data.nobelprize.org/data/laureateaward/699>  
dc:date 2019-05-23T19:30:18.016Z
prv:containedBy <http://data.nobelprize.org/dataset>
void:inDataset <http://data.nobelprize.org/dataset>
rdf:type prv:DataItem
rdf:type foaf:Document